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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CARLA K. PARKER, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
vs. 
DALE S. PARKER, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
: CASE NO. 981362 -
: PRIORITY NO. 15 
- CA 
DALE S. PARKER, hereinafter "husband" or "appellant", 
submits the following Brief: 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from multiple orders in a domestic 
relations case entered by the Third Judicial District Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant Rules 
3 and 4 of the UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE and to §78-2a-
3(2) (h) UTAH CODE ANN. (1998). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
entering a bifurcated order granting the divorce of the 
parties and reserving the remaining issues for trial where 
1 
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the Appellant objected due to prejudice. The standard of 
review for this issue is an abuse of discretion standard. 
Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., LTD. v. Smith's Food £ Drug 
Ctrs.. Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah App. 1994); Breuer-
Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 730 (Utah App. 1990); 
King v. Barron, 770 P.2d 975, 976 (Utah 1988). 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering that the date of valuation of the marital estate 
would be April 15, 1996, the date of the bifurcated decree, 
rather than the date of the trial. The standard of review 
for this issue is an abuse of discretion standard. Peck v. 
Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987) (holding that 
where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, 
or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under 
its broad discretion, value the property at a date other 
than the date of divorce.) 
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to divide the parties' various bank accounts as part 
of the marital estate or the value thereof, given the 
substantial monies involved and the fact that Appellee 
controlled the monies in said accounts. The standard of 
review for this issue is that changes to a trial court's 
2 
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property distribution in a divorce case "will be made only 
if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law 
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence 
clearly preponderated against the findings, or such a 
serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse 
of discretion," Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah App. 1988) (citing English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 
410 (Utah 1977); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 
App. 1987)) . 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to award the parties' interest in Murray Parkway, 
LLC, equally rather than to Appellee where the value of the 
interest was difficult to determine and speculative? The 
standard of review for this issue is that changes to a trial 
court's property distribution in a divorce case "will be 
made only if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, 
the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Naranjo, 751 P.2d at 1146 (citing 
English, 565 P.2d at 410; Eames, 735 P.2d at 397). 
3 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Appellant submits that there are no statutory or 
constitutional provisions determinative of the issues 
presented herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
This is an appeal from the final orders as contained in 
the Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Supplement Decree of Divorce, Order of Custody, Property 
Settlement and Other Related Matters, both dated April 27, 
1998 and entered by the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Sandra N. 
Peuler, Third District Court Judge, presiding, and from the 
final order entitled Order Denying Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order and Motion to Reopen Case in Chief to Take 
Additional Testimony; Denying Motion for Clarification and 
Motion For a New Trial; and Order Denying Objections to 
Proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree of Divorce and Other Related Matters, dated May 
29, 1998. Further, this is an appeal from orders entered 
prior to the final orders, including the Order Bifurcating 
4 
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Divorce, dated March 6, 1996, Order on Respondent's 
Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation, dated April 1, 
1996, the bifurcated Decree of Divorce, dated April 15, 1996 
and the Order in Re: Evaluation Date, dated February 2 6, 
1998- The orders, permitted the earlier award and 
bifurcation of a Decree of Divorce, ordered the valuation 
date for purposes of value of the marital estate to be the 
date of the bifurcated Divorce of April 15, 1996. A Notice 
of Appeal was filed by the Appellant on June 24, 1998 
subsequent to the post-trial order dated May 29, 1998. 
Appellee filed for divorce in the lower court on October 
31, 1995. Temporary orders were entered based upon 
stipulation. Appellee filed a Motion to Bifurcate the 
divorce action to grant her a Decree of Divorce. Appellant 
opposed the motion at the time of hearing before the 
Honorable Third District Court Commissioner Thomas N. 
Arnett, Jr., but a bifurcated divorce was recommended and an 
Order Bifurcating Divorce was entered on March 6, 1996. 
Appellant objected to the Commissioner's recommendation 
which granted the Bifurcated Decree and requested a hearing 
on his motion. The Honorable Judge Sandra N. Peuler denied 
the Objection and the Motion for Hearing indicating that 
5 
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Appellant would not be prejudiced by the court's granting of 
the bifurcation while recognizing that Appellant disputed 
the bifurcation insofar as it may effect property awarded to 
the parties at the trial on this matter. Index, pg. 130-
131. A Bifurcated Decree of Divorce was awarded on April 
15, 1996. 
A pre-trial hearing and motion came before the court on 
the determination of the valuation date for purposes of 
valuing the marital estate on July 11, 1997 and a Minute 
Entry issued on that date, though the order arising from the 
hearing was not signed until February 26, 1998; which 
ordered that the date of the bifurcated Divorce was the date 
of valuation of the marital assets and estate. 
All issues attendant to the divorce came on regularly 
for trial on July 31, 1997, August 1, 1997, October 23, 
1997, October 24, 1997 and October 28, 1997. The court took 
the matter under advisement and a Minute Entry Memorandum 
Decision was issued by the court dated December 10, 1997. 
The Supplemental Decree of Divorce and Supplemental Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed and entered by 
the court on April 27, 1998. 
Subsequent to the divorce trial and prior to the Judge's 
6 
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Minute Entry decision, the Appellant filed a Verified Motion 
for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion to Reopen Case in 
Chief to take additional testimony. Subsequent to the 
Minute Entry decision of the court, the Appellant also filed 
a Motion for Clarification and Motion for New Trial and 
Objections to the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Decree of Divorce. The post-trial motions came 
on for hearing on April 27, 1998 and the Order arising from 
the post-trial motions was entered by the court May 29, 
1998. From these orders, the Appellant has filed a timely 
Appeal. (The Order Bifurcating Divorce is attached hereto 
and designated as Addendum "A". The Order on Respondent's 
Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation is attached 
hereto and designated as Addendum "B". The Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce are attached 
hereto, designated as Addendums "C" and "D", respectively. 
The July 11, 1997 Minute Entry and the Order in Re: 
Evaluation Date are attached hereto, designated as Addendums 
"E" and "F", respectively. The Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce and Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law are attached hereto, designated as Addendums "G" and 
"H", respectively. The Order Denying Motion for Temporary 
7 
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Restraining Order and Motion to Reopen Case in Chief to take 
additional testimony; Order Denying Motion for Clarification 
and Motion for New Trial; and Order Denying Objection to 
Supplemental Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree 
of Divorce and Other Related Matters is attached hereto and 
designated as Addendum "I".) 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties were married to each other March 26, 1971. 
(R. 1)• The parties separated in mid-October, 1995. (R. 1, 
R. 1022, p. 16, 11. 19-23). Appellee filed a complaint for 
divorce on October 31, 1995. (R. 1). At the time of the 
parties' separation, both the Appellee and the Appellant 
owned numerous parcels of real property, either solely or 
jointly- The Appellant prepared Defendant's Exhibit "10" 
which exhibit reflected all real estate owned by both or 
either of the parties as of April, 1996, exclusive of three 
building projects that the Appellant was working on at that 
time. (Said exhibit is attached hereto, designated as 
Addendum V " ) . (R. 1025, p. 691, 11. 17-25 and p. 692, 11. 
1-6). The properties included real estate at 2214 
Bonniebrook, which was a duplex that the Appellant testified 
was purchased with a $10,000-00 gift for the down payment 
8 
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from the Appellant's parents. (R. 1025, p. 692, 11. 7-14). 
That property was in the Appellee's name only, though the 
parties had treated the property in all respects as a joint 
investment and Appellant put a great deal of time and work 
into that duplex. (R. 1025, p. 693, 11. 1-25 and p. 694, 
11. 1-4). The mortgage on the property was paid for out of 
the parties' joint account. (R. 1025, p. 694, 11. 7-10). 
The second property at 6305 South 1300 West in Murray 
was in both parties' names. (R. 1025, p. 696, 11. 1-5). It 
was this property in which Appellant resided subsequent to 
the separation. (R. 1025, p. 657, 11. 10-11). Another 
property was Lot 105, Borgs Mountain View, which was in the 
Appellant's name. (R. 1025, p. 700, 11. 17-25). Further, 
the parties had a partial interest in an Idaho property 
known as Lot 10, Almost Heaven, which was actually in the 
name of the Appellee's brother. (R. 1025, p. 704, 11. 5-
17). The parties also owned a one-half interest in 83 acres 
in Kooskia, Idaho. (R. 1025, p. 706, 11. 15-25 and p. 707, 
11. 1-12). The parties also had a property at 1772 Dove 
Hollow Circle which the Appellant constructed and which was 
in the name of Appellee. (R. 1025, p. 708, 11. 16-25). 
This is the property in which Appellee resided subsequent to 
9 
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the separation. (R. 1022, p. 13, 11. 5-8). 
Another property of the parties was a 1/6 interest in 
the Appellee's business building at 150 East Vine Street 
which was not in the Appellant's name. (R. 1025, p. 716, 
11. 15-25 and p. 717, 11. 21-23). The parties also owned a 
property at 1070 Denver Street which had Appellee's name on 
the title as well as one of their children but was paid for 
by the parties. (R. 1025, p. 717, 11. 24-25 and p. 718, 11. 
1-25 and p. 719, 11. 1-5). 
At the time of the parties' divorce there was also a 
real property known as Lot 7, River Bluff Estates, Spokane, 
Washington which was in the name of the Appellee, only. The 
Appellant did not even know of the existence of the property 
until some time during the divorce action. (R. 1025, p. 
716, 11. 2-8). Appellee arranged for a Quit Claim Deed to 
be prepared, purporting to be signed by the Appellant, quit 
claiming his interest in the property. This was done 
without Appellant's knowledge and the signature was not his, 
though it was notarized. This action by Appellee was 
testified to by Appellant (R. 1025, p. 715, 11. 21-25 and p. 
716, 1. 1) and by Tamara Torkelson. (R. 1022, p. 160, 11. 
16-25 and p. 161, 11. 1-25 and p. 162, 11. 1-24). Ms. 
10 
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Torkelson testified that the Appellee did not want the 
Appellant to know about the real property and the Quit Claim 
Deed was signed by someone other than the Appellant and Ms. 
Torkelson then had an employee of hers, notarize the 
document. Ms. Torkelson also testified that the Appellee 
had informed her approximately three years prior to the time 
of trial of an intent on Appellee's part to put money in her 
sister's name or somebody's name to hide it from Appellant. 
(R. 1022, p. 163, 11. 14-25 and p. 164, 11. 1-11). 
Lastly, at the time of the parties' divorce the parties 
had an interest in a partnership known as Murray Parkway 
LLC, which is a development company comprised of 33 acres in 
Murray, Utah which is pasture land which had been owned by 
Appellant's parents and family for many years. (R. 1026, p. 
764, 11. 19-25). The Murray Parkway property is next to the 
Appellant's parents home and right behind the home in which 
Appellant resides. (R. 1026, p. 765, 11. 3-10). It was 
partly the location of the property which led the Appellant 
to try to acquire the property for development. (R. 1026, p. • 
765, 11. 11-21). Prior to the acquisition of the property, 
the parties had numerous conversations and agreed that they 
should have a partner, Martin Merrill, for financial 
11 
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backing. (R. 1026, p. 766, 11. 3-14). Prior to purchasing 
the property, the Appellant had conversations regarding the 
purchase with his father alone, and after his father had a 
stroke, the financial arrangements were made with his 
mother. (R. 1026, p. 767, 11. 10-21). Appellant testified 
that his name, while on the Earnest Money Agreement was not 
on the Murray Parkway, LLC, documents, because it made no 
difference to him whether his name appeared as a member. 
(R. 1026, p. 769, 11. 24-25 and p. 770, 11. 1-8). The 
Appellant testified that Appellee took actions after the 
separation to commence the development of the project 
without his involvement (R. 1026, p. 769, 11. 15-23), but 
that Appellant intended to be involved in the project. (R. 
1026, p. 770, 11. 21-23). Further, the Appellant was asked 
if he believed that the value of the Murray Parkway project 
could be ascertained at the time of divorce. Appellant 
testified that he believed it's future worth was between one 
and two million dollars, in profit. His testimony was 
objected to Appellee's attorney and the judge sustained the 
objection indicating that she did not believe that the 
Appellant had the expertise as a developer to testify 
regarding the value. However, the court clearly heard the 
12 
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testimony of the Appellant that he did not believe that the 
appraised value of the land itself at April 15, 1996, was 
the true value of the LLC. This testimony was not objected 
to. (R. 1026, p. 771, 11. 2-5, p. 770, 11. 24-25, p. 771, 
11. 1-25, p. 772, 11. 1-25, and p. 773, 11. 1-12). 
The Appellant testified at trial that he believed that 
the court should divide the parties' 50% interest in the 
Murray Parkway project, one-half to each so that each would 
be "members" with a 25% interest. Appellant specifically 
testified that he believed that this division was fair and 
that the judge should not value the property at its value at 
April 15, 1996 because of the profits that were going to be 
realized when the development was completed. (R. 1026, p. 
774, 11. 6-18). In his testimony, Appellant agreed that he 
should participate and pay one-half of any and all monies or 
costs that may have been paid out since the parties' 
bifurcated divorce, so that he would participate in one-half 
of any out of pocket expenses with the 50% partner, Martin 
Merrill. (R. 1026, p. 774, 11. 6-18). 
Martin Merrill testified that he was the past partner 
with Appellee in the Sunrise Flats project and her current 
partner in the Murray Parkway project. (R. 1023, p. 308, 
13 
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11. 24-25 and p. 309, 11. 1-10). 
Mr. Merrill testified that in the course of operating 
the Sunrise Flats investment with Appellee that he 
maintained the checking account (R. 1023, p. 323, 1. 25 and 
p. 324, 11. 1-2). Defendant's Exhibit 36 reveals a 
distribution from the Sunrise Flats account to the Appellee, 
Carla K. Parker, on September 21, 1995 in the sum of 
$91,666.67, which Mr. Merrill testified was a return of her 
investment. (R. 1023, p. 324, 11. 14-21). Mr. Merrill also 
testified to additional distributions from the Sunrise Flats 
account to Carla K. Parker of $7,000.00 on September 11, 
1995, $10,000.00 on September 20, 1995 and $7,250.00 in 
December, 1995. (A copy of the Appellant's exhibit is 
attached hereto, designated as Addendum "K"). Mr. Merrill 
testified that those distributions pretty much closed up the 
project known as Sunrise Flats. (R. 1023, p. 327, 11. 9-
25) . 
Mr. Merrill testified that the parties and he started 
discussing the Murray Parkway project five or six years 
prior to the time of trial and that there were discussions 
with Appellant's parents that did not always involve him. 
(R. 1023, p. 316, 11. 1-14). Mr. Merrill testified that the 
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original Earnest Money Agreement indicated that "Murray 
Parkway LLC, will be formed after this offer is accepted. 
It will consist of Marin Merrill, Dale Parker and/or Carla 
Parker." (R. 1023, p. 317, 11. 18-24). Mr. Merrill 
testified that he was present when Mr. Parker's parents 
signed the final Uniform Real Estate Contract which is 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63 (attached as Addendum "L") and that 
Doug Parker, Appellant's father, signed with an "X". (R. 
1023, p. 318, 11. 14-24) . 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract that was entered into 
between the parties and Appellant's parents was a non-
interest bearing note with a $50,000.00 down payment, and 
Mr. Merrill testified that Appellee, Carla Parker, suggested 
to him that an additional $50,000.00 payment be made on the 
note in June of 1996, even though the contract did not 
require the same. (R. 1023, p. 330, 11. 17-25 and p. 331, 
11. 1-17). While Mr. Merrill testified that Appellant 
expressed no interest in being a "member" of the LLC, he 
also testified that the Appellant made it clear that he 
wanted to be involved in the project and that his role in 
the project was as a part owner and co-developer along with 
the Appellee and Mr. Merrill. (R. 1023, p. 332, 11. 13-22). 
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Mr. Merrill also testified that the signatures of Leone and 
Doug Parker, Appellant's parents, on the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract were notarized a day or two later at his office. 
The notarization did not occur as it should have, in the 
presence of the Parkers. (R. 1023, p. 333, 11. 13-25 and p. 
334, 11. 1-8). At the time of trial, Mr. Merrill testified 
that all original documents were being held in escrow with 
his company, Merrill Title Company. (R. 1023, p. 335, 11. 
21-25). The Uniform Real Estate Contract had not been filed 
at the time of trial and neither had any notice of interest 
(R. 1023, p. 336, 11. 4-9) . 
At the conclusion of his testimony, Mr. Merrill was 
asked if, during this time, he had a relationship with 
Appellee of a personal and intimate nature. He responded, 
"I've been advised by my attorney not to answer that 
question, to take the Fifth Amendment." (R. 1023, p. 354, 
11. 24-25 and p. 355, 11. 1-5). 
Mr. Merrill was asked if he had any objection to 
Appellant rejoining Murray Parkway LLC, and developing the 
project and he indicated "no." (R. 1023, p. 337, 11. 10-
16). Mr. Merrill also testified that in acquiring Murray 
Parkway and developing the lots that it was the agreement 
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between Merrill and the parties that each of the sons of the 
Appellant and Appellee were to receive a building lot in the 
development. (R. 1023, p. 340, 11. 12-25 and p. 341, 11. 1-
4). Mr. Merrill testified that the value of the property at 
the time of its purchase was just as farmland and that it 
had no value other than as a farm but that the Murray 
Parkway, LLC had been successful in obtaining zoning and had 
commenced the access and development of the project. (R. 
1023, p. 342, 11. 4-22). Appellant's counsel asked what the 
value of the land was going to be once it was developed. 
Appellee's counsel objected and the court sustained the 
objection. Further foundation was laid regarding Mr. 
Merrill's previous experience in development projects and 
his opinion was asked again as to what the ultimate value of 
the property might be. In response the following objection 
and exchange occurred: 
Ms. Donovan: Your honor, I would again object. I 
believe, at this point it would be purely 
speculative as to what the property might be worth 
when it's completed. 
The Court: I tend to agree. I am going to sustain 
the objection. 
Q. (By Ms. Williams) Does the current value bear 
any—well, let me rephrase that. The Murray Parkway 
project will have much greater value once it's 
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developed; is that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The current value is not representative of what 
the future value will be? 
A. Well, that's correct, because there aren't any 
streets or I mean there's there's a lot of 
money that needs to be spent on the improvement of 
the property. So, yes, once all those roads are put 
in, definitely, the value would be greater than it 
would be now. 
Q. And the return to you of your investments; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So if we think of the property, not that you're 
an inventor, but if we think of the property in 
terms of someone who's who's inventing a medical 
device, it's something that you've paid for but you 
don't know what the value in the future might be. 
Is that what you're telling me? 
A. Correct. 
(R. 1023, p. 343, 11. 21-25 and p. 344, 11. 1-24). 
In addition, on another subject, Mr. Merrill testified 
that he had issued a check for $32,000.00 to Appellee, doing 
business as Reality Brokers Performance on February 16, 1996 
which Mr. Merrill testified was lost or misplaced and a new 
check was directed to Appellee on January 14, 1997. (R. 
1023, p. 346, 11. 16-25 and p. 347, 11. 1-4). Mr. Merrill 
further testified that at the date of his testimony on 
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August 1, 1997 that the check had not cleared his Merrill 
Title account. (R. 1023, p. 349, 11. 8-15). 
In addition, the Appellant's mother, Leone Parker, 
testified that she and her husband gave Appellant the lot 
upon which the parties' home at 6305 South 200 West was 
built. (R. 1023, p. 369, 11. 11-18). She also testified 
that she gave each of her children $10,000.00. (R. 1023, p. 
370, 11. 2-8). Lastly, as to the Murray Parkway property, 
she testified that she sold her acreage to "Dale and Carla 
Parker and Martin Merrill". (R. 1023, p. 370, 11. 13-16). 
Ms. Parker testified that her husband was born on the 
property and that she and her husband had owned it since 
approximately 1951 and that it had been passed down from his 
family. (R. 1023, p. 371, 11. 3-7). Ms. Parker testified 
that she sold the property to Dale and Carla and Martin 
Merrill because "Carla told me several times that they all 
wanted ground close to home that he could build houses on." 
(R. 1023, p. 371, 11. 18-23). Ms. Leone Parker testified 
that it was her intention that her son have a portion of the 
property and that she would not have sold it if "Dale hadn't 
been in it. And I would not have sold it if I had known a 
divorce was coming up." (R. 1023, p. 374, 11. 1-19). 
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The Appellant was employed during the entirety of the 
marriage, initially as a mechanic and then in the field of 
construction. Appellant went into business for himself as a 
contractor in June of 1986, doing business as Aspen View 
Homes. (R. 1025, p. 658, 11. 8-22). Though sometimes 
people would come in with their own building lots and 
request that Appellant build a home for them, his primary 
source of work was the Appellee, as a realtor, finding 
buyers or finding lots and Appellant building spec houses. 
(R. 1025, p. 659, 11. 1-9). The Appellee testified that she 
had been in the real estate business since 1981 and a 
broker, doing business as Reality Brokers Performance since 
1990. (R. 1022, p. 17, 11. 8-24). 
In the course of the parties working together in 
building and selling homes, there were numerous bank 
accounts in one or the other's name, both at the date of 
separation and the date of divorce. Appellant outlined the 
accounts in Defendant's exhibits #7 and page six of #10, 
which are attached as Addendum "M" and "J" respectively. 
Appellant testified that he did not have check writing 
privileges on the Realty Broker's account with First 
Interstate Bank but that Appellee had check writing 
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privileges on the Appellant's business account at Cyprus 
Credit Union and that she regularly wrote checks out of that 
account. (R. 1025, p. 667, 1. 25 and p. 668, 11. 1-10). 
Also, the parties had a joint checking account with Cyprus 
Credit Union (R. 1025, p. 668, 11. 11-18), and a separate 
account under the name "Parker Enterprises" which business 
entity owned and paid for vehicles and other miscellaneous 
personalty. (R. 1025, p. 668, 11. 23-25 and p. 669, 11. 1-
11). The Parker Enterprises account was a joint account but 
Appellee managed that account. Appellee was in charge of 
paying the family bills, (R. 1025, p. 672, 11. 16-24) and 
balancing the check books. (R. 1025, p. 673, 11. 2-3). 
Appellant's Exhibits 7 and 10 (Addendums "M" and "J") also 
reveal various other bank accounts. Defendant's Exhibit 7 
outlines the summary of accounts at the date of separation 
and at the date of divorce. 
The accounts excluded the bank accounts for Murray 
Parkway and Total Surprise, the parties' houseboat. The 
attachments to Defendant's Exhibit 7, document the account 
balance at or about the parties' separation in October of 
1995 and at the divorce in April of 1996. Appellant 
testified that his business account (attachment D to Exhibit 
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7), was depleted by the Appellee at the date of the parties' 
separation by her removal of $71,000.00 from the account on 
October 23, 1995; leaving $602.91 in the account. Appellee 
unilaterally used those funds to pay off the line of credit 
against the parties' residence. (R. 1025, p. 690, 11. 5-9, 
p. 683, 11. 24-25, and p. 684, 11. 1-20). In addition, the 
Appellant testified that he transferred this account to an 
account in his own name at Cyprus Credit Union, account 
#96770 and that he funded that account by borrowing 
$10,000.00 against two of his credit cards, so that of the 
$11,446.91 balance in the checking account at the time of 
the parties' divorce, $10,000.00 was reflected with off-
setting debt from the two credit cards. (R. 1025, p. 690, 
11. 21-15 and p. 691, 11. 1-11). Appellant testified 
through Defendant's exhibits 7 and 10, both of which were 
received by the court with no objection from Respondent, 
that at the date of separation Appellee took control and 
maintained control of all of the accounts except for 
Appellant's new Cyprus Credit Union account. 
A review of the summary of ac_ its, as set forth in 
Defendant's Exhibit 7, reveals that at separation Appellee 
took control of accounts A, B, C, E, F, G, H and I or 
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already had control of those accounts and "gutted" account 
D. The balances of those accounts of which Appellee had and 
kept control totaled $134,516.49, as set forth below in the 
illustration of Exhibit 7, which illustration includes the 
balance at separation of each account and by whom it was 
received, and the balance at divorce and by whom it was 
received. For purposes of the illustration, however, the 
Appellant has reduced the business account #96770, Cyprus 
Credit Union, "D" by the $10,000.00 debt that offset it in 
Exhibit 10. As outlined below, at separation, the Appellant 
was left with $688.41 and Appellee was left with 
$134,516.49. At the date of divorce, the balance in the 
accounts in control of Appellee was then $36,986.74 and the 
balance of Appellant's accounts totaled $1,735.37. 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTS 
RESTATEMENT OF DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT 7 
Exhibit 
A 
B 
Account 
Cyprus Credit 
Union 
Acct #74823 
(Parker 
Enterprises) 
Cyprus Credit 
Union 
Acct#6591 
(Joint Account) 
Balance at 
Separation 
$134.83 
$4,643.50 
Plaintiffs 
Possession 
$134.83 
$4,643.50 
Defendant's 11 Balance at 
Possession j|Divorce 
II $5942 
| | $2,74936 
| | $515 89 
Plaintiff's 
Possession 
$59.42 
$2,749.36 
$515.89 
Defendant's 
Possession 
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c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
Cyprus Credit 
Union 
Acct #50830 
Cyprus Credit 
Union 
Acct #57172 and 
Acct #96770 
Zions Bank 
Acct#017370586 
(Plaintiff's 
Personal Account) 
First Interstate 
Bank 
Acct#21042197 
(Realty Brokers 
Performance) 
Key Bank 
Acct# 
440690002777 
(Sunrise Flats) 
First Interstate 
Bank 
Acct #21186416 
(Dove Hollow 
Savings) 
First Interstate 
Bank 
Acct #21043708 
(Dove Hollow 
Checking) 
Totals 
$102,041.91 
$688.41 
$1,756.17 
$20,104.08 
$2,077.00 
$3,106.00 
$653.00 
$135,204.90 
$102,041.91 
$1,756.17 
$20,104.08 
$2,077.00 
$3,106.00 
$653.00 
$134,516.49 
- 1 
$688.41 
1 
1 $3,829.98 
$1,446.91 
$288.46 
$16,347.25 
$10,089.84 
$250.00 
$3,145.00 
1 n/a 
$688.41 | $38,720.61 
$3,829.98 
$16,347.25 
$10,089.84 
$250.00 
$3,145.00 
1 $36,986.74 
$1,446.91 
$288.46 
$1,735.37 
In support of the Appellant's position in regard to the 
bank accounts, Appellant called an expert witness, Robert 
Miller, a CPA. Mr. Miller testified using Defendant's 
Exhibit 7 which had been prepared by Mr. Miller, Appellant 
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and Appellant's counsel, Mr. Miller testified that 
Defendant's Exhibit 7. represented the cash balances in the 
respective accounts taken either directly from the accounts 
or as could be imputed as best he could from the statements 
and records that were available. (R. 1024, p. 556, 11. 16-
24) . Mr. Miller testified that he reviewed the bank account 
statements from each of the accounts and looked for cross-
account transfers and transactions. (R. 1024, p. 557, 11. 
4-24) . Mr. Miller testified that he reviewed account 
records over a period of months; primarily from the date of 
separation through the date of divorce and a few months 
subsequent as well. (R. 1024, p. 558, 11. 1-8). Mr. Miller 
carefully went through the exhibit explaining his dollar 
balances and any corrections or reductions based on 
transfers between accounts. (R. 1024, p. 558-567, and R. 
1025, p. 608-609). Mr. Miller also testified that he 
reviewed tax returns for Sunrise Flats, Dove Hollow, Murray 
Parkway, Reality Brokers Performance, Parkers Enterprises 
and Reality Brokers Service Corporation and that Exhibit 10 
set forth the accounts in the marital estate at April 15, 
1996. (R. 1024, p. 575, 11. 3-14). Mr. Miller went on to 
explain the numerous distributions that the Appellee had 
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received in her separate accounts from the investment 
entities Sunrise Flats and Dove Hollow, (R. 1025, p. 612-
613) outlining the unaccounted for funds that Appellee had 
received from Sunrise Flats on December 20, 1995 for 
$7,250.00, and the unaccounted for funds Appellee had 
received from Sunrise Flats on November 6, 1995 for 
$41,991.91. (R. 1025, p. 615, 11. 18-25 and p. 616, 11. 1-
19). Mr. Miller testified that as receivables or funds 
received by Appellee and unaccounted for in the bank 
accounts, these were additional monies which should have 
been divided at the date of the divorce. (R. 1024, p 574, 
11 14-25.) 
The parties had stipulated to the entry a Temporary 
Order, but, on December 22, 1995, less than two months after 
the filing of the Complaint for Divorce, a Motion for 
Bifurcation was filed by the Appellee. (R. 38-39.) In 
support of the Motion, Appellee filed a Memorandum, in which 
Appellee stated that "An immediate Decree of Divorce will 
eliminate the risk of claims by Defendant that investments 
Plaintiff has or property Plaintiff acquires in the future 
or assets which appreciate in value should be part of the 
marital estate, and therefore subject to equitable 
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distribution." (R. 43). However, neither at that time nor 
at any later time prior to trial did the court allocate or 
actually award particular items of personal property, real 
property or money assets to either of the parties. At the 
date of the filing of the Motion, however, as has been set 
forth above, the Appellee had the "lion's share" of the real 
property in her name or control, and the business 
investments and bank accounts in her name alone or with a 
partner, exclusive of Appellant, even though the particular 
assets were all marital assets. 
The parties appeared at the time of hearing on a Motion 
for Bifurcation on February 13, 1996 and by Minute Entry 
Decision the Commissioner, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr., 
recommended the granting of the bifurcation. (R. 92). In 
response, an Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation 
was filed by Appellant. Specifically, in the Objection, the 
Appellant asked that the court not grant the bifurcation 
because the Appellant believed that Appellee had been 
holding assets and monies pending the divorce so that she 
could take proceeds as her sole property. In other words, 
Appellant alleged that Appellee had been doing "divorce 
planning" and the Appellant would be prejudiced thereby. 
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(R. 100) . 
The Order Bifurcating the parties' divorce was entered 
by the court on March 6, 1996. (R. 119-121). Thereafter and 
by Minute Entry, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, the judge denied the Appellant's 
Objection to Recommendation indicating that the Appellant 
would not be prejudiced by the Court's granting of the 
bifurcation, since at the time of trial the court would have 
the authority to divide all assets owned or accumulated 
prior to the granting of the divorce. (R. 122-24). This 
Minute Entry was reduced to a court order and entered April 
1, 1996. (R. 130-32). 
The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact were signed 
by the court and entered April 15, 1996. The Decree of 
Divorce severed the marital relationship, but all issues 
were reserved for trial. (R. 136-37). 
Given the bifurcated divorce and a disagreement between 
counsel as to the appropriate valuation date for purpose of 
the upcoming trial, the parties agreed that a pre-trial 
hearing was necessary for purpose of determining the 
valuation date. Appellant and Appellee each filed 
memorandums of law regarding the valuation date. 
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Within Appellant's Memorandum, Appellant argued that in 
order to attain an equitable distribution of the marital 
assets, the marital estate should be valued at the time of 
trial and that the court had discretion to determine what 
date of valuation would provide the most equitable 
distribution. Given the fact that Appellee had filed the 
divorce and the Motion for Bifurcation quickly, appeared to 
be engaged in divorce planning, including the forging of the 
Appellant's name on a Quit Claim Deed, and had control of 
the marital monies and real properties, the Appellant argued 
that the trial date should be used for the valuation of the 
marital estate. (R. 355-83) (A copy of this memorandum is 
attached as Addendum "N"). The motion came on for hearing 
on July 11, 1997 and the court determined that the date of 
the bifurcated divorce would be the valuation date, "unless 
assets were hidden or tried to be hidden or marital assets 
were used to increase the value of something they have." 
(R. 384). The order arising from that hearing was signed by 
the court February 26, 1998. (R. 724-26). 
Subsequent to trial held on July 31, 1997, August 1, 
1997, October 23, 1997, October 24, 1997 and October 28, 
1997, the court took the matter under advisement and a 
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Minute Entry decision was issued by the court on December 
10, 1997. This Minute Entry was later contained in 
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce dated April 27, 1998. (R. 
803-37) . Prior to the Minute Entry decision, the Appellant 
filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Motion to 
Reopen Case in chief to take additional testimony. The 
Motion was brought by Appellant due to actions taken on the 
part of the Appellee to sell real estate that was admittedly 
part of the marital estate and the apparent receipt and 
deposit by the Appellee of a $32,000.00 commission which she 
earned at or about the time of the parties' divorce. (R. 
675-714). At the time of trial, Martin Merrill testified 
that Appellee had refused the commission. (R. 1023, p. 347, 
11. 21-25). Appellee's witness, Kevin Gates testified that 
the $32,000.00 commission had not been paid, to his 
knowledge and that he believed that Appellee had waived her 
commission. (R. 1023, p. 229-230, 11. 22-25, 1-7). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's decision to bifurcate this divorce 
action and later decision to use the bifurcation date as the 
valuation date of the marital estate caused substantial 
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prejudice to Appellant's right to an equitable share of the 
marital estate and was an abuse of discretion. At April 15, 
1996, the date of bifurcation, Appellee had control of eight 
of the parties' nine bank accounts and most of the parties' 
real estate, however, none of this property was actually 
"divided" by an order of the court until the trial, over one 
year after the bifurcation. As none of the marital estate 
was divided, it all remained "marital" until the trial. 
Because Appellee was awarded all of the accounts under her 
control, as well as the majority of the real estate 
(including the parties' interest in the Murray Parkway 
project), in addition to Appellee having the use and 
enjoyment of the majority of the marital estate, Appellant 
was not awarded any of the appreciation on these marital 
assets from April 15, 1996 until October 28, 1997, the last 
day of trial. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not dividing 
the parties' bank accounts, or the value thereof. In 
addition, the trial court erred in not putting a value of 
said accounts, in spite of bank statements being admitted 
into evidence, Appellant's expert testimony tracing the 
funds, and Appellee's complete lack of evidence establishing 
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the amounts in the accounts or controverting the amounts as 
established by the evidence. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not valuing the 
parties' bank accounts as of the date of separation due to 
Appellee's blatant dissipation of the marital estate and 
hiding of the funds. 
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding the 
parties' entire marital interest in Murray Parkway, LLC, to 
Appellee rather than dividing the membership interest 
between the parties equitably, given that all of the 
evidence presented, as well as the trial court's findings 
establish that the value of the interest is speculative and 
cannot be determined. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN PERMITTING A 
BIFURCATION OF THE DIVORCE. 
Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows the 
trial court to bifurcate issues "in furtherance of 
convenience or to avoid prejudice . . • ." Therefore, it 
follows, that a bifurcation should not be granted where to 
do so would cause prejudice to a party, not "avoid" 
prejudice. See Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 
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716, 730 (Utah App. 1990). In Breuer this Court upheld the 
bifurcation of the issue of the fair market rental value of 
a property because the parties had entered a binding 
stipulation and this issue was "irrelevant" to the other 
claims and cross-claims. 799 P.2d at 730. However, in the 
present case, the issues of the control, the use, the 
appreciation of and the changes to the marital estate, as 
well as the speculative value of the development project, 
are not irrelevant to the subsequent division of the estate. 
See Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr., LTD., v. Smith7s Food & 
Drug Ctrs., Inc., 889 P.2d 445, 462 (Utah App. 1994) 
(affirming an order bifurcating the issues of damages and 
liability in a breach of lease action because the change in 
the value of the property was too "speculative," and the 
nature of the property at the time of bifurcation 
"encumbered by the lease, [was] completely different from 
the property unencumbered by the lease"). 
Appellee moved to bifurcate this divorce action in 
December of 1995, two months after filing for divorce. (R. 
38). Appellee supported this motion with a memorandum very 
accurately arguing that "[a]n immediate Decree of Divorce 
will eliminate the risk of claims by Defendant that 
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investments Plaintiff has or property Plaintiff acquires in 
the future or assets which appreciate in value should be 
part of the marital estate, and therefore, subject to 
equitable distribution." (R. 43) (emphasis added). 
This is exactly what happened in this case; the decree 
was entered, the de facto allocation of the assets benefited 
the Appellee, and the Appellant was not allowed an equal or 
equitable distribution of the marital estate. This was a 
twenty-five year marriage. Appellee did not bring any pre-
marital property into the marriage. However, Appellee 
argued that a bifurcated decree would "eliminate the risk of 
claims by Defendant that investments Plaintiff has or 
property Plaintiff acquires in the future or assets which 
appreciate in value should be part of the marital estate, 
and therefore, subject to equitable distribution." The 
items in bold above, under all Utah law, are part of the 
marital estate and subject to equitable distribution. See \ 
Marsh v. Marsh, P.2d , (1999 Utah App. 014) 
("[M]arital property ^encompasses all of the assets of every 
nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived;'" (quoting Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah 1988) (quoting Englert v. Englert, 576 , 
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P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978))). It is contrary to Utah's 
entire body of law concerning marital property and its 
equitable distribution to allow Appellee to use a bifurcated 
decree to deny Appellant an equitable share of the marital 
estate. 
The trial court denied Appellant's request for a 
hearing and entered the bifurcated divorce because 
"Defendant will not be prejudiced by the Court's granting of 
the bifurcation since at the time of the trial the Court 
will have the authority to divide all assets owned or 
accumulated prior to the granting of the divorce." (R. 130-
31). Therefore, without a hearing on the issue, and without 
considering the prejudice to Appellant due to Appellee's 
control of eight out of the parties' nine bank accounts and 
a disproportionate share of the real estate holdings 
(including the soon to be developed 33 acre Murray Parkway 
Subdivision), the trial court entered the divorce, and later 
established this date as the valuation date of the marital 
estate. 
Appellant is not arguing that bifurcated decrees should 
not be entered in divorce proceedings. Bifurcated divorce 
decrees can serve the beneficial purpose of allowing parties 
35 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to sever their legal marital relationship, as well as 
allowing them to retain their post-bifurcation earnings and 
invest them as they see fit. However, a bifurcation should 
not be employed to set the valuation date of the marital 
estate where evidence as to the value and division of the 
estate is not taken until over a year later. Otherwise 
severe prejudice will happen where one party has control of 
most of the assets and bank accounts, as in the present 
case. 
This bifurcated decree was not entered "in furtherance 
of convenience or to avoid prejudice" as proscribed by Rule 
42 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The bifurcation 
caused prejudice to Appellant. Therefore, the trial court 
abused its discretion in bifurcating this action on April 
15, 1996 and then subsequently using this date as the 
valuation date of the marital estate where no division of 
the estate was made until over one year later. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THAT 
THE DATE OF VALUATION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WOULD BE 
APRIL 15, 1996, THE DATE OF THE BIFURCATED DECREE, 
RATHER THAN THE DATE OF TRIAL. 
There is a general rule in Utah that the marital estate 
should be "valued at the time of divorce or trial." 
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Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citing Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App. 
1993); Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); 
accord Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 
1980); Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987). 
None of Utah's cases involve a trial court valuing a marital 
estate at the date of a bifurcated decree. Each of these 
cases dealt with the issue of whether to value the marital 
estate at trial, or at the date of separation. 
As to this body of case law, the general rule is 
followed except where one party has "dissipated an asset, 
hidden its value, or otherwise acted obstructively." Peck, 
738 P.2d at 1052; £££ also Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 433 
(affirming the trial court's use of a date other than the 
date of divorce where one party utilized portions of the 
marital estate for his own support and the other party had 
little or no access to the liquid assets of the estate 
during the pendency of the action); Andersen v. Andersen, 
757 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1988). There is no rule or case law 
which provides for a valuation date for the marital estate 
when a bifurcated divorce decree is entered. Therefore, in 
determining the valuation date for the marital estate, the 
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trial court must determine which valuation date will provide 
the most equitable distribution. 
Subsequent to a hearing, the trial court ordered that 
the marital estate would be valued as of April 15, 1996, the 
date the bifurcated decree was entered. However, there was 
no division of the marital estate as of April 15, 1996, and 
there was no evidence as to what the marital assets 
consisted of, what their respective value was, nor was there 
any temporary division of said assets. As set forth in the 
statement of facts, the vast majority of these assets were 
controlled by Appellee at April 15, 1996. Therefore, the 
trial court's decision manufactured an artificial date to 
value to the marital estate, without dividing it, but in 
doing so divided the estate de facto. 
As most of the real property assets and eight out of 
nine bank accounts were under Appellee's control and awarded 
to her, all of the appreciation on these marital assets from 
April 15, 1996 until the trial in October of 1997 were 
awarded solely to Appellee because of this artificial date 
of valuation and the defacto award of the asset by virtue of 
possession of the asset at the date of the bifurcated 
decree. 
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Regardless of when the bifurcated order was entered, 
since the marital assets were not divided by the court, all 
of the marital assets remained marital assets until the 
division of the assets at the trial and by the court's 
minute entry decision. Because these assets remained 
marital assets until the Supplemental Decree of Divorce was 
entered, the appreciation of these assets is also a marital 
asset which should have been equitably divided by the trial 
court. 
By virtue of the trial court using April 15, 1996 as the 
date of valuation of the marital estate, the trial court 
effectively "divided" the estate as of that date, greatly 
prejudicing the Appellant with regards to the parties' 
interest in all of the marital assets, including the marital 
interest in the Murray Parkway, LLC. As of April 15, 1996, 
the land was still mostly undeveloped. The pasture land 
value of this property was far less than its development 
value. Both of the parties, the witness Martin Merrill, and 
the court each commented on the speculative future value of 
this project. By valuing the Murray Parkway, LLC as of 
April 15, 1996 even though there is no dispute that it was a 
marital asset purchased for development from Appellant's 
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family, the Appellant has been severally financially 
prejudiced. 
The trial court abused its discretion in using the date 
of April 15, 1996 as the valuation date. This defeats the 
purpose and reasoning of prior cases that require the 
valuation date be the date of "divorce" because the divorce 
date is typically the date of trial which is when the assets 
are actually divided. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
DIVIDE THE PARTIES' VARIOUS BANK ACCOUNTS BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES OR THE VALUE THEREOF, GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL 
MONIES INVOLVED AND THE FACT THAT APPELLEE CONTROLLED 
NEARLY ALL OF THE MONEY IN SAID ACCOUNTS. 
As stated above, in the Facts section, the parties' 
maintained nine bank accounts between them. The attachments 
to Defense Exhibit 7 (Addendum "M") document the account 
balance at or about the parties' separation in October of 
1995 and at the divorce in April of 1996. At separation, 
the Appellee had control of eight of these nine accounts. 
The Appellant was left with $688.41 and Appellee was left 
with $134,516.49. At the date of the bifurcated divorce 
decree, the balance in the accounts in control of Appellee 
was only $36,986.74 and the balance of Appellant totaled 
$1,735.37. Therefore, the accounts in Appellee's control 
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diminished nearly $100,000.00 during the six months between 
the parties' separation and the entry of the bifurcated 
order. 
In support of the Appellant's position in regards to the 
bank accounts, Appellant's expert witness, Robert Miller, 
testified that Defendant's Exhibit 7 represented the cash 
balances in the respective accounts taken either directly 
from the accounts or as could be imputed as best he could 
from the statements and records that were available. Bank 
statements were also admitted into evidence showing the 
respective balances on the dates of separation and divorce. 
In spite of this evidence and testimony as to the value 
of these accounts at the different dates, the trial court 
found that: 
"[t]here is no specific accounting of all of the 
bank accounts, however, either as to the source of 
deposits or nature of expenditures, that will allow 
the Court to accurately determine any net value of 
the accounts to divide the same fairly. Therefore, 
the Court awards each account to the holder of the 
same, and makes no valuation for purposes of the 
marital estate." (R. 82 9) (emphasis added). 
However, Appellant did offer a very specific accounting of 
the accounts, and Appellee testified that she did not 
because Appellant had "already provided an accounting in his 
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exhibits about what was in [her] accounts." (R. 1024, p. ; 
537, 11. 14-17). Appellee called no experts to testify 
regarding the parties' bank accounts and submitted the 
following limited testimony as evidence concerning the bank 
accounts: 
(Appellee's Counsel): Let me talk to you a little 
bit about these bank accounts, Ms. Parker, and, 
again, calling your attention to our Exhibit 4-A, 
if you'd turn to that page. There's been testimony 
during the course of the trial about the bank 
accounts and what was in there or what was in there 
the day after the divorce, and you heard the 
accountant testify about that. 
This deposit, the $17,452.51 deposit that was 
made on April 16, 1996, do you remember when I 
asked Mr. Miller, showing him your check register 
to show that taxes were paid with the money? 
A. (Appellee): Yes. 
Q. And is that your recall as well? 
A. Yes. I paid the — I wrote the check out for 
the IRS and the state on April 15th, but didn't 
make the deposit until the 16th. 
Q. Okay. And is it your position that that 
deposit certainly shouldn't be included in the bank 
A. Yes. 
Q. - - accounts? What is your position with 
respect to your business accounts being included at 
all? 
A. Well, I - - I don't see how there's any way even 
feasible to include them. Each of the entities 
i 
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have their own expenses and cash flow that run 
through the accounts. It would be really hard to 
even determine what was in there from one day to 
another. But the account -- the business accounts 
are operating capital for each entity. 
Q. And expenses are paid out of those accounts? 
A. Exactly. (R. 1026, p. 890-91, 11. 1-25, 1-4). 
The only other testimony offered by Appellee as to the value 
of the accounts came on redirect: 
Q. (Appellee's Counsel) And is it your testimony 
that your ex-husband has already provided an 
accounting in his exhibits about what was in your 
accounts? 
A. (Appellee) Yes. (R. 1024, p. 537, 11. 14-17). 
The Appellee made no effort whatsoever to trace the funds 
she received at the separation or divorce. Her testimony 
was limited and vague. 
"The trial court must make findings on all material 
issues, and its failure to do so constitutes reversible 
error 'unless the facts in the record are clear 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment.'" Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 8 6, 
87 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1983); Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983)). "[T]he trial court's failure to include 
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property valuations in divorce actions may constitute an 
abuse of discretion sufficient to require remand for 
determination," Id. at 88 (citing Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1074 (Utah 1985); Boyle v. Boyle. 735 P.2d 669, 671 
(Utah App. 1987)J1; £££ also Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 
119 (Utah App. 1990) (holding that a marital property 
distribution must be based on adequate findings and "[t]hese 
findings must place a dollar value on the distributed 
assets'7) (emphasis added) . 
In Carlton, the marital assets included ''at least 
thirteen different stocks and bonds, six savings accounts, 
four checking accounts" and numerous other assets. Id. The 
evidence and testimony admitted at trial by the parties' 
contested the value of these accounts. Id. The trial court 
failed to place specific values on the accounts. Id. This 
Court found that "the facts in the record are not * clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment.'" Id. at 89 (quoting Acton, 737 P.2d 
at 999). Accordingly, this Court held "that the trial 
1
 Note in Jones and Boyle the court affirmed the trial court's findings even though 
lacking values because the Appellant's counsel in each case drafted the findings. In the 
present case, Appellee's counsel drafted the findings. 
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court's failure to make findings as to the value of the 
parties' assets constitutes reversible error requiring this 
Court to remand for entry of additional findings." Id. 
In Munns the trial court "was so concerned with finding 
the appropriate property values that, when the valuation 
evidence was inadequate, it continued the hearing for 
further appraisal information." 790 P.2d at 119.2 In Munns 
the Appellant failed to enter the necessary evidence at 
trial, and appealed the trial court's decision to accept the 
Appellee's proposed valuation of the property. Id. 
In the present case, as stated above, Appellant 
submitted the relevant bank statements and the expert 
testimony of a CPA, as well as his own testimony and 
numerous exhibits. Appellee did not admit any evidence, 
other than the aforementioned statement that "it would be 
really hard to even determine what was in there from one day 
to another." However, the difficulty of the valuation of a 
marital asset is not an adequate justification for the trial 
court to refuse to value said asset. 
In Sorensen v. Sorensen, the trial court was faced with 
2
 Appellant moved to reopen the case to take additional testimony, however this 
motion was denied by the trial court on May 29, 1998. (R. 843). 
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the difficulty of valuing goodwill in a company pursuant to 
a property distribution in a divorce. 769 P.2d 820 (Utah 
App. 1989). The trial court placed a value on the goodwill 
of Dr. Sorensen's dental practice. Id. at 824. Dr. 
Sorensen appealed. One of the arguments which Dr. Sorensen 
made on appeal was that goodwill should not be considered in 
the distribution of the marital estate because it was 
difficult to value. Id. at 828. In response to this 
argument, this Court stated that this was the "most 
unpersuasive argument." Id. Further, this Court stated 
that "the mere fact that goodwill may be difficult to value 
or elusive in nature, does not justify ignoring or 
disregarding it altogether in the valuation of marital 
property." Id. 
In the present case, Appellant presented evidence, the 
relevant bank statements, as well as the expert testimony of 
a CPA, as to the value of the respective marital accounts at 
the relevant dates. This evidence was only controverted by 
cross3 and Appellee's statement that the accounts would be 
difficult to value. Appellant submits that his evidence on 
this issue was "clear and uncontroverted." The burden then 
3
 The cross of Mr. Miller, the CPA, can be found at R. 1025, T. 626-647. 
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shifted to the Appellee to provide evidence to the trial 
court as to what the balances of the accounts were, from 
what sources, and where the money went. She failed 
completely to establish any of these criteria. 
The trial court's failure to place a value on these 
marital assets and to simply award them to the party who had 
control of them, given that Appellee had control of the vast 
majority of these accounts, severally prejudiced the 
Appellant, imbalanced the division of the marital estate, 
and is an abuse of discretion and reversible error. See 
Carlton, 756 P.2d at 89; Munns, 790 P.2d at 119; Boyle, 735 
P.2d at 671; Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
VALUE THE PARTIESf BANK ACCOUNTS AT THE DATE OF 
SEPARATION DUE TO APPELLEE'S EXTREME DISSIPATION OF 
THESE MARITAL ASSETS. 
The general rule is that the marital estate should be 
valued as of the entry of the divorce decree or trial. See 
Berger, 713 P.2d at 697; Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262; Peck, 
738 P.2d at 1052; Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 
App. 1989). "However, in the exercise of its equitable 
powers, a trial court has broad discretion to use a 
different date, such as the date of separation, when 
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circumstances warrant." Shepherd, 876 P.2d 432-33 (citing 
Peck, 738 P.2d at 1052) (emphasis added). "[W]here one 
party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or 
otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under 
its broad discretion, value the property at an earlier date, 
i.e. separation." Peck, 738 P.2d at 1052 (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
In Shepherd this Court affirmed the trial court in 
valuing the marital estate at the time of separation where 
one party to the divorce: 
"utilized portions of the marital estate for his 
own support during the pendency of the action and 
the defendant had no access to the liquid assets 
during that period . . . . plaintiff not only 
enjoyed the benefit of the use of the marital 
assets for his own support, but also enjoyed the 
income and other benefits derived from the marital 
assets during the pendency of the action . . . . 
plaintiff depleted the liquid assets of the marital 
estate . . . ." 876 P.2d at 433. 
These same factors are present in the case at bar. 
Through Defense Exhibit 7 (Addendum M), the Appellant 
showed which accounts were in Appellee's control and which 
was in Appellant's control at both the date of separation, 
and the date of the bifurcated decree. This exhibit also 
showed the balances of these nine accounts as determined by 
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the relevant bank statements, exhibits, and the expert 
testimony of Mr. Miller, CPA. 
At separation, the Appellee had control of eight of 
these nine accounts. The Appellant was left with $688.41 
and Appellee was left with $134,516.49. At the date of the 
bifurcated divorce decree, the balance in the accounts in 
control of Appellee was only $36,986.74 and the balance of 
Appellant totaled $1,735.37. Therefore, the marital 
accounts in Appellee's control diminished nearly $100,000.00 
during the six months between the parties' separation and 
the entry of the bifurcated order. It should be noted that 
during this time, Appellee's income was approximately 
$8,333.00 per month according to a Verified Motion and Child 
Support Worksheet submitted in October of 1995. (R. 9-15). 
Appellee's expenses were approximately $6,606.80 per month 
as claimed in her Financial Declaration. (R. 164). 
However, even with this surplus monthly income, Appellee 
testified that she wrote $35,000.00 worth of checks out to 
herself which she "lived off" in November of 1995. (R. 
1024, p. 464-65, 11. 18-25, 1-3). Another check was written 
out to herself on November 6, 1995 for $62,991.91 that 
Appellee testified she used to "live on." (R. 1024, p. 466, 
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11. 6-17). Later, concerning this additional $63,000.00, 
Appellee testified that: 
A. (Appellee): I don't remember what I did with it. 
It wouldn't -- it wouldn't have been spent all in 
one place. It wouldn't be something I'd remember. 
(R. 1024, p. 467, 11. 6-8). 
This enormous amount of money out of the parties' marital 
estate was dissipated or hidden by Appellee from the date 
Appellee filed for divorce in October of 1995 through the 
end of that year. 
Further, on October 23, 1995, eight days before filing 
for divorce, Appellee nearly emptied this Appellant's only 
account by writing a $71,000.00 check to pay off a home 
equity line of credit which Appellant was using to fund his 
business. (R. 1024, p. 491, 11. 14-24). Only $602.00 was 
left in the only account Appellant had access to. (R. 1024, 
p. 492, 11. 12-16). 
This blatant dissipation of the marital estate and 
"divorce planning" which Appellee used to hide all of the 
parties' liquid assets and leave Appellant with only $602.00 
required that the trial court use the date of separation to 
value the marital bank accounts. See Peck, 738 P.2d at 
1052; Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 433. 
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V. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
DIVIDE THE PARTIES' INTEREST IN MURRAY PARKWAY LLC. 
EQUALLY GIVEN THAT THE VALUE OF THE INTEREST WAS 
DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE AND SPECULATIVE. 
A property division made by the trial court will not be 
upheld "where to do so would work a manifest injustice or 
inequity." Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1986) 
(citing Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6, 8 (Utah 1982). In 
addition, property distributions will be overturned where 
the trial court fails to follow the standards set by the 
appellate courts. Potter v. Potter, 845 P.2d 272, 273 (Utah 
App. 1993) (citing Roberts v. Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 
(Utah App. 1992); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 
App. 1990)) . 
A. The Trial Court's Distribution Of The Parties' 
Entire Interest In The Murray Parkway Subdivision 
To The Appellee Must Be Overturned As The 
Distribution Failed To Follow The Standards Set By 
The Appellate Courts. 
One standard which has been established by the appellate 
courts is that in fairly dividing a marital estate, if the 
value of a business interest or stock is disputed and varies 
widely, "in order to protect the parties, and eliminate 
altogether the considerable problems in determining value, 
the in-kind division of [the interest] [is] the proper 
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solution." Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 
1983). 
In Savage, the parties valued shares of stock in a 
closely held corporation between $899,340.00 and 
$4,072,000.00. l£L. at 1203. Due to the enormous disparity 
between the values forwarded by the parties, the trial court 
awarded each party an interest in the stock. Id. The 
Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the award as it was 
"impossible to deal fairly with the parties in any other 
way." JsL. at 1205. 
"Wherever possible, this Court avoids division of 
marital stock between parties because it forces them to be 
in a ^close economic relationship which has every potential 
for further contention, friction, and litigation, especially 
when third parties having nothing to do with the divorce 
will also necessarily be involved." Argyle v. Arayle, 688 
P.2d 468 (Utah 1984) (quoting Savage, 658 P.2d at 1206 
(Stewart, J., dissenting)). This basic rule is applicable 
where, in cases such as Argyle, a couple has a business 
which is capable of being accurately valued. However, where 
the value is more difficult to determine and speculative, as 
in the present case, Utah courts have held that the only 
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equitable solution is to divide the stock or interest 
between the divorcing couple. See Savage, 658 P.2d 1201; 
Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987). 
In Savage, the husband had a one-third interest in a 
family owned coal and lumber company. 658 P.2d at 1202. 
When the couple divorced, the trial court heard differing 
testimony as to the value of the interest. Id. at 1203-04. 
The contrasting valuations were due to the difficulty in 
determining the worth of shares in a closely-held 
corporation. Id. at 1203. The trial court determined, and 
the Supreme Court of Utah upheld, that because the evidence 
concerning the valuation of the corporation was credible on 
both sides "any cash distribution risked doing substantial 
injustice to one party." Id. at 1205. Following this 
reasoning, the Supreme Court of Utah held that the division 
of the corporate stock between the divorcing couple was the 
proper solution. Id. 
A similar situation occurred in Lee. In Lee, the 
husband had a 52% interest in a business and at divorce the 
trial court awarded him the full 52%. 744 P.2d at 1381. At 
trial, the parties disagreed as to the value of business. 
Id. At the appellate level, the case was remanded with the 
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appellate court stating that "[i]f the trial court, because 
of the great disparity of testimony, was unable to assign a 
value to [the business], then the court could have made an 
in-kind distribution of [the business] stock to the wife." 
Id. The present case is analogous to both Lee and Savage. 
A substantial portion of the marital estate, in the 
present case, consists of a 50% interest in Murray Parkway, 
LLC. As stated in the Facts section above, the land was 
purchased by the LLC due to Appellant's contacts and labor. 
The land was purchased from Appellant's family with the 
understanding that Appellant would be a co-owner and also be 
the builder of the homes in the subdivision. 
The subdivision, as an undeveloped property, was 
appraised by Mr. Webber at approximately $32,000 per acre. 
However, this appraisal did not consider that this property 
was in the process of becoming a developed property. 
According to Appellant and Mr. Merrill, the property has far 
greater value as a development. (R. 1023, p. 344, 11. 3-8). 
However, this value is extremely difficult to accurately 
determine, due to it being a closely held corporation as 
well as the difficulty in valuing developing land, much the 
same as the difficulties in both Savage and Lee. Therefore, 
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due to the speculative nature of valuing closely held 
corporations and land developments, the marital interest in 
Murray Parkway, LLC should be divided between the parties 
because "any cash distribution risk[s] doing substantial 
injustice to one party." Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205. 
Another analogous case with regards to the distribution 
of a speculative marital asset is Naranjo v. Naranjo. 751 
P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988). In Naranjo, one of the parties 
to a divorce action had purchased some National Military 
Underwriters stock. Id. at 1149. The trial court found 
that the value of the interest in the stock at the time of 
trial was "unknown." Id. Due to the speculative and 
unknown value of the stock, the trial court awarded each 
party one-half of the stock. Id. This Court affirmed 
stating that "[a]n in-kind distribution of closely-held 
corporate stock is appropriate where the evidence fails to 
establish the stock's value." Id. (citing Savage, 658 P.2d 
at 1204-05). Further, this Court stated that "[i]t would be 
inappropriate, given the speculative nature of the 
investment . . . for [one party] to receive all of the stock 
and [the other party] to receive offsetting property." Id. 
The trial court found that "it is impossible to project 
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[the] future value" of the Murray Parkway Subdivision. (R. 
830). In addition, when Appellant offered evidence as to 
the value of the interest in developing the Murray Parkway 
Subdivision, Appellee objected on the basis of the 
development's speculative nature and the trial court 
sustained the objections. 
Appellee's Council: Your honor, I would again 
object. I believe, at this point it would be purely 
speculative as to what the property might be worth 
when it's completed. 
The Court: I tend to agree. I am going to sustain 
the objection. 
(R. 1023, p. 343, 11. 21-25). 
The trial court valued the Murray Parkway Subdivision as 
undeveloped land. Only the value of one-half of the 
parties' equity in the property at April 15, 1996 was 
divided in the property distribution, even though both 
parties, witnesses for both parties, and the findings 
entered by the trial court all acknowledge that the property 
was bought for and in the process of being developed. It is 
contrary to all common sense that the 33 acres would be 
valued as undeveloped land when, even prior to April 15, 
1996, the property was already in the process of early 
development. (See excerpts from Plaintiff's Exhibit 59 
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Addendum "0") / 
Appellee made initial inquiries into attaining this 
property for development in 1991 or 1992. (Addendum "0", p. 
1). The recommendation to rezone the property for a single 
family residential development was attained on January 10, 
1995. (IdL at 2, 8). By April 24, 1995, Mr. Merrill 
requested an initial environmental assessment of the project 
by JBR Environmental Consultants, Inc. (Id. at 9). JBR 
completed the first phase of this assessment by May 30, 
1995. (Id. at 11). Upon receiving an application for the 
development from Appellee, the Murray City Attorney, on July 
10, 1995, recommended that the development be approved by 
the Salt Lake County Flood Control Organization. (Id. at 
13). The parties separated in mid-October of 1995. On 
November 21, 1995, the Salt Lake County Public Works 
Department gave the development preliminary approval. (Id. 
at 14). On April 15, 1996, the Army Corps of Engineers 
notified Mr. Merrill that a permit would not be required for 
4
 It should also be noted that the Murray Parkway project will consist of 113 
building lots, Appellee did testify as to the value of one residential building lot in South 
Jordan. She testified that it was worth $50,000.00, "and that's very conservative." (R. 
1022, T. 54,11. 4-11). Therefore, assuming that only 100 lots will be developed, at 
$50,000.00 per lot, that totals $5,000,000.00. 
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the development as the property had already been inspected 
in 1992. (Ifl, at 15). The bifurcated decree of divorce was 
entered on April 15, 1996. On October 7, 1997, the Murray 
City Planning Staff recommended to the Murray City Planning 
Commission that Phase One of the development project be 
approved subject to certain conditions. (Id. at 16). 
The supplemental findings entered on April 27, 1998 
state that "although the property is a marital asset, it is 
impossible to project future value . . . ." (R. 830). This 
is by no means a justification for not valuing and equitably 
distributing a marital asset or interest. For example, this 
is often the case with retirement accounts and why they are 
divided one-half to each party rather than offset against 
some other marital asset. 
In discussing similar difficulties with valuing 
retirement accounts, the Supreme Court of Utah stated that 
"where no present value can be established and the parties 
are unable to reach agreement, resort must be had to a form 
of deferred distribution based upon fixed percentages." 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1982) (quoting 
Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 79-80 (N.J. 1981))/ See 
also Sorensen, 769 P.2d at 828 (holding that the argument 
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that goodwill in a dental practice should not be subject to 
equitable distribution because it was difficult to value was 
the "most unpersuasive argument," and "the mere fact that 
goodwill may be difficult to value or elusive in nature, 
does not justify ignoring or disregarding it altogether in 
the valuation of marital property,") 
All of the relevant witnesses testified that the Murray 
Parkway property was an investment and that they intended to 
realize a profit on the property. Appellant testified that 
he expected that the development of the property would 
realize between one and two million dollars in profit,5 and 
Appellee's witness, Mr* Merrill, testified that the project 
would have a much greater value once it was developed. (R. 
1023, p. 344, 11. 3-8). 
"Whether that resource is subject to distribution 
does not turn on whether the spouse can presently 
use or control it, or on whether the resource can 
be given a present dollar value. The essential 
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or 
asset has accrued in whole or in part during the 
marriage. To the extent that the right has so 
accrued it is subject to equitable distribution." 
Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432-33. 
The interest in the property was acquired by the parties 
5
 R. 1026, T. 771,11. 7-10, this testimony was objected to and the objection was 
sustained. 
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during the marriage and the right to develop the property 
accrued "in whole or in part" during the marriage. The 
right to develop a piece of raw land in Murray City is 
certainly a right to a benefit, even if a future benefit, 
which is subject to equitable distribution. As stated in 
Woodwardf where a present value on a future benefit is 
difficult to ascertain, some distribution according to fixed 
percentages should be employed. Therefore, as applied to 
the parties' interest in the right to the benefit of 
developing the Murray Parkway property, where the trial 
court found that "it is impossible to project [the] future 
value"6 of the development property, the trial court abused 
its discretion by not dividing the parties' interest in this 
marital asset on a percentage basis of the interest 
according to the standards set by the appellate courts in 
Savage and Lee. 
B. The Trial Court's Distribution Of The Parties' 
Entire Interest in The Murray Parkway Subdivision 
To The Appellee Must Be Overturned As The 
Distribution Caused A Manifest Injustice Or 
Inequity. 
A property division made by the trial court will not be 
upheld "where to do so would work a manifest injustice or 
6
 Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f21, (R. 830). 
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inequity." Puseyr 728 P.2d at 119 (citing Turner, 649 P.2d 
at 8). The Murray Parkway development is a primary marital 
asset in this case. The land that is in the process of 
being developed was acquired from Appellant's parents and 
distant relatives. As testified to by the parties, and Mr. 
Merrill, and as found by the trial court, the value of this 
marital interest is very speculative. 
Appellant testified that he believed the development 
would realize between one and two million dollars in profit. 
(R. 1026, T. 771, 11. 7-10). Appellee objected to this 
testimony, and the objection was sustained, due to 
Appellant's lack of expertise in development projects. In 
addition when Appellee's witness, Mr. Merrill (who holds the 
other 50% interest in the Murray Parkway LLC), was asked 
concerning the project's development value this exchange 
occurred: 
Q. (Appellant's Counsel) Does the current value 
bear any — well let me rephrase that. The Murray 
Parkway project will have much greater value once 
it's developed; is that true? 
A. (Mr. Merrill) Yes. 
Q. The current value is not representative of what 
the future value will be? 
A. Well, that's correct, because there aren't any 
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streets or — I mean, there's — there's a lot of 
money that needs to be spent on the improvement of 
the property. So, yes, once all of those roads are 
put in, definitely, the value would be greater than 
it is now. 
Q. And the return to you on your investment; is 
that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So if we think of the property, not that you're 
an inventor, but if we think of the property in 
terms of someone who's — who's inventing a medical 
device, it's something that you've paid for but you 
don't know what the value in the future might be. 
Is that what you're telling me? 
A. Correct. (R. 1023, p. 344, 11. 3-24) (emphasis 
added). 
In addition, Mr. Merrill, who testified that the Murray 
Parkway project is the fourth subdivision development that 
he's been involved in,7 also testified on direct that: 
"Murray city has given the preliminary approval of 
the entire project. I haven't had the formal city 
council final approval for phase one, but through 
all of the various entities that need to approve 
the subdivision plat of Murray City, basically, 
they've all given their -- their final approval." 
(R. 1023, p. 321, 11. 8-13) . 
Even at April 15, 1996, when the bifurcated decree was 
entered, substantial steps had been taken to attain 
7
 R. 1023, p. 343,11. 3-9. 
62 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
development approval of this project* (Addendum "0"). 
Despite all of this uncontroverted evidence establishing 
that the property was in the process of being developed and 
the difference in the property's value as raw or potentially 
developed, the trial court accepted and valued the property 
as raw, undeveloped land and awarded it to Appellee* Such 
an award should not be upheld due to the "manifest 
injustice" and "inequity" inflicted on the Appellant- See 
Pusey, 728 P.2d at 119; Turner, 649 P.2d at 8). 
By valuing the development project as simple raw land in 
spite of the uncontroverted intent and development efforts, 
the trial court failed to consider a valuable marital asset 
in its division. This would be the equivalent of valuing a 
business only as desks, chairs, and phones with no 
consideration given to profitability, goodwill, or rights to 
future benefits. 
As argued above, "[m]arital property is ordinarily all 
property acquired during the marriage and it ^encompasses 
all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, 
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn 
v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting 
Englert, 576 P.2d at 1276)• This includes accounts 
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receivable, tangible assets, and goodwill in a company. Id. 
at 1318 (citing Sorensen, 769 P.2d at 832). In addition, 
the marital estate includes "the right to a future income . 
. . where the right is derived from products produced during 
the marriage, even in cases where that right cannot be 
easily valued." Id. (emphasis added)(citing Moon v. Moonr 
790 P.2d 52, 56-57 (Utah App. 1990)/ Sorensen, 769 P.2d at 
827/ Woodward, 656 P.2d at 432-33). 
In Dunn the trial court determined that the wife did not 
have a marital interest in the husband's royalty rights for 
his inventions of surgical instruments which were invented 
during the marriage. Id. at 1319. The husband argued that 
the inventions came as a result of 2 6 years of education and 
training, most of which predated the marriage. Id. This 
Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in not 
awarding the wife one-half of the value of this future 
royalty interest as a marital asset. Id. 
This is analogous to the present case. Mr. Merrill, the 
only witness, who is experienced in development projects, 
agreed that the rights to the future profits in a 
development project were analogous to the rights of an 
invention where you put in the time initially and then reap 
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the benefits in the future. (See excerpt of testimony 
above). In this case, as submitted by the Appellee, 
extensive efforts to develop the Murray Parkway project 
occurred prior to trial, prior to the bifurcated order, and 
prior to the separation of the parties. (Addendum "0"). 
These marital efforts created a right to the future benefit 
of the proceeds of this project. 
The trial court's award of the parties' entire interest 
in the Murray Parkway project to the Appellee, with an 
offset to Appellant at the raw undeveloped value of the 
property, was an abuse of discretion and was manifestly 
unjust and inequitable. "[An] in-kind division . . . was 
[the] proper solution." Savage, 658 P.2d at 1205. 
CONCLUSION 
For the forgoing reasons, Appellant requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court on the issues presented and 
order that (1) the marital estate, with the possible 
exception of the parties' bank accounts, be valued at the 
date of trial; (2) that due to Appellee's dissipation of the 
parties' bank accounts, that these bank accounts be valued 
as of the date of separation, one-half to each party, which 
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requires an adjustment in favor of Appellant in the sum of 
$66,914.04; and (3) that due to the substantial yet 
speculative nature of the value of the parties' interest in 
Murray Parkway, LLC, that the parties' 50% membership 
interest be divided one-half to each. Further, Appellant 
requests his costs on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of February, 1999. 
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